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Abstract 
The firm competition has a double quality: while it fills in as a proficient disciplinary 
component for firms' management, it additionally worsens vocation concerns and 
increases capital market weights. This investigation analyzes the impact of financial 
reporting quality and corporate governance on the competition. While from one 
viewpoint item showcase competition goes about as a disciplinary instrument in less 
aggressive enterprises, then again, it incites chiefs not to act to the greatest advantage 
of investors in more focused businesses. These findings have suggestions for the plan of 
corporate governance instruments and official remuneration contracts including 
relative execution assessment for mining companies. 
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INTRODUCTION 
 
 Competition has for quite some time been contended as a productive 
disciplinary corporate governance instrument (Hart, 1983). In particular, Shleifer and 
Vishny (1997) contend that "item showcase competition is likely the most intense 
power towards financial proficiency on the planet." Yet, various ongoing financial 
report embarrassments that happened in businesses with generally large amounts of 
competition which gives occasion to feel qualms about some item advertise 
competition has a positive restraining impact on firms. This paper wants to investigate 
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the impact of distortion of financial report quality on the competition. In this paper, we 
look at the impact of item showcase competition on money-related financial report 
distorting and the substitute instruments through which item advertise competition 
could influence monetary financial report distorting.  
 Distorting financial report data can be considered as a great case of short-
termism or administrative astigmatism where the organizations' management swear off 
long-haul investor esteem for here and now picks up (Narayanan, 1985; Thadden, 
1995). Given the hypothetical contentions and late experimental proof (Guadalupe and 
Pérez-González, 2005; Grullon, Michaely, 2007) on the disciplinary impacts of 
competition, we would expect that item showcase competition disciplines supervisors 
against meddling and controlling the detailed financial report data.  
 We inspect two particular components through which item showcase 
competition influences the distorting of financial report data – one is through office 
clashes while alternate wins even without office costs. Under the organization cost see, 
distorting financial report data can be considered as a result of an office issue, 
particularly, an ethical danger one identifying with supervisors' profession concerns. 
The current writing contends that office expenses and firm-level corporate 
administration components differ with item advertise competition (Cremers, Nair, and 
Peyer, 2007; Guadalupe and Pérez-González, 2005).  
 Truth be told, some contend that administrative slack will not exist in 
profoundly focused enterprises (Friedman, 1953; Stigler, 1958). As needs are, one 
would expect that expanded item advertise competition ought to decrease the office 
issue of distorting. Be that as it may, one should take note of that management see 
revelations identified with their firm execution as signs of their administrative 
capacities (Trueman, 1986) to the capital markets and to the top managerial staff. 
Recognizing that the nature of financial report data the firm unveils is a decision 
variable, Hermalin and Weisbach (2007) demonstrate that elevated profession concerns 
may make directors misshape the revelations they make. In the item showcase setting, 
DeFond and Park (1999) demonstrate that CEO turnover increments with item 
advertise competition and that leaving CEO are those from inadequately performing 
firms. DeFond and Park (1999) additionally contend that since aggressive conditions 
are helpful for the utilization of relative-execution assessment, it is simple for the 
directorate to recognize and supplant ineffectively performing chiefs. This infers 
management in focused enterprises confronts a consistent weight of beating their 
associates, or if nothing else not falling behind. This proposes item showcase 
competition would elevate directors' vocation concerns and, subsequently, increment 
the penchant of chiefs to distort.  
 Indeed, even without organization costs, there are elective components through 
which item showcase competition influences distorting. One such instrument is the 
continuous cooperation of the firm with open capital markets for getting restricted 
capital. We allude to this opposition for restricted subsidizes as capital market weights. 
Shleifer (2004) contends that the talk in the writing of financial report data control has 
to a great extent disregarded the significance of this evident competition for constrained 
capital assets.  
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 The most ordinarily examined advantage of expanded straightforwardness and 
divulgences is that it diminishes data asymmetry and, consequently, brings down the 
cost of exchanging the association's securities and the association's cost of capital 
(Diamond and Verrecchia, 1991). Further, the proximity of contenders subject to 
similar demand and supply forces prompts information that empowers money related 
authorities to overview the conditions under which the associations work in this way 
alleviating a part of the hostile assurance issues. This conflict suggests that as the 
quantity of firms in an industry that looks for the obliged resources constructs, the 
nature of information furthermore increases and, in this manner, the level of twisting 
reduces. Regardless, Stein (1989) exhibits that overseers would relinquish total cash 
streams to help without further ado pay with a true objective to affect the market's 
present examination of the organization's regard. Gill and Bebchuck (2003) contend 
that organizations are probably going to distort corporate execution when a firm is 
probably going to issue stock. In an experimental setting, Teoh et al. (1998) find that 
supervisors in IPO firms embrace pay expanding financial report strategies before stock 
issuance. This last contention proposes that expanded item showcase competition will 
bring about more prominent levels of distorting.  
 To abridge, management' vocation concerns and capital market weights are two 
elective systems through which item showcase competition influences distorting of 
financial report data. The discourse so far infers that ex-stake, the net impact of item 
showcase competition on the nature of open budgetary financial report data is 
equivocal and, hence, an exact inquiry. While it is conceivable that expanded item 
showcase competition can fill in as a productive observing and teaching instrument, it 
may be that higher competition builds the expenses of giving data of higher quality 
prompting unfavorable results.  
 Cohen (2006) and Harris (1998) who give observational confirmation inferring 
that organizations in less aggressive businesses are more averse to report brilliant 
financial report data. Strikingly, we additionally find that this outcome relies upon the 
level of item showcase competition. While from one perspective item advertise 
competition goes about as a disciplinary system in less aggressive ventures, then again, 
it incites supervisors not to act to the greatest advantage of investors in more focused 
enterprises. This discovering identifies with the setting particular nature of the 
adequacy of Relative Performance Evaluation (RPE) as examined in the current writing 
(DeFond and Park, 1999).   
 The motivation of this study to explore the collaboration between the impacts of 
competition for constrained capital subsidizes out in the open capital markets and the 
impacts of item advertise competition on the degree of financial report distorting as 
confirm in profit repetitions. At the end of the day, we look at the weight from open 
capital markets and its impact on the nature of financial report data while recognizing 
the part of item advertise competition in such a setting. We locate that capital markets 
weight unfavorably influence firms' detailing quality in very aggressive enterprises. 
This confirmation shows that item showcase competition influences budgetary 
distorting both through organization instruments and capital market weights.  
 The difference with a prior study that this paper adds to the current writing in a 
few different ways. In the first place, we portray an exact setting in which item 
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competition influences the nature of budgetary data as shown in income repetitions 
through two unmistakable components. In doing as such, we present the idea of 
organization clashes amongst management and investors while researching the 
connection between item advertise competition and budgetary detailing approaches. 
What's more, our evidence adds to the hypothesis of corporate governance by 
proposing that capital market weight contemplations and profession concerns ought to 
be considered when determining official pay gets that utilization Relative Performance 
Evaluation (RPE). One of the main criticisms advanced in the empirical literature on 
the consequences of financial accounting reporting and disclosures is the failure to 
properly adjust for the endogeneity problem apparent in these studies. The research 
design we employ in the current study indirectly addresses this problem by performing 
an industry-level analysis. Thus, many of the firm-specific variables determining the 
choice firms make regarding their reporting strategies are not affecting the results we 
report and make us confident that we are not merely documenting spurious relations. 
 The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 provides a 
literature review and presents the hypotheses development. Section 3 describes the 
research design we employ and addresses methodological issues. Section 4 presents the 
sample selection criteria and discusses the empirical results. Section 5 concludes. 
 
LITERATURE REVIEW AND HYPOTHESIS 
 
 This paper use agency theory as a grand theory. The agency conflict can 
influence the report quality through management discretion and be supported by 
asymmetry information. The firm’s owners did not know how well and fair the 
presentation of the financial report. They depend on the auditor opinion, but in some 
cases, the opinion also untrusted. In high competition environment, management cannot 
risk their reputation by publishing poor financial report nor performance. They prefer to 
manipulate financial report to diminish their reputation.   
 
Financial Report Quality, Competition and Corporate Governance 
 The part of item showcase competition in decreasing administrative slack goes 
back to Hart (1983). A few hypothetical papers formalize this thought by looking at the 
potential channels through which item advertise competition can affect administrative 
impetuses (Schmidt, 1997; Raith, 2003). A few late experimental examinations appear 
to help this thought item showcase competition gives the motivating forces to chiefs to 
be more proficient and all the more firmly lined up with investors' interests (Guadalupe 
and González, 2005; Grullon and Michaely, 2007; Giroud and Mueller, 2007).  
 A vital component through which item advertise competition decreases 
organization clashes is by encouraging relative execution assessment (RPE) of senior 
directors. In the CEO turnover writing, Gibbons and Murphy (1990) and DeFond and 
Park (1999) look at the connection between RPE and CEO turnover. DeFond and Park 
(1999) report coordinate confirmation on how RPE is influenced by item advertises 
competition which thus influences CEO turnover. Specifically, DeFond and Park 
(1999) record that the recurrence of CEO turnover is decidedly identified with the level 
of industry competition recommending that RPE fills in as a valuable measure of 
execution assessment in more aggressive ventures. In this way, this writing to date 
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proposes that organizations in more aggressive businesses, in balance, will have higher 
nature of money related revealing and lower occurrences of distorting of financial 
report signals whereupon execution assessment is based. We allude to this impact as 
the 'observing impact' (indicated as connection in Figure 1) through which the office 
channel relates item advertise competition and money related to announcing quality.  
 In any case, for similar reasons, one could expect that item showcase 
competition will increment distorting. As a help for this elective view, a stream in the 
writing contends that expanded item advertise competition raises top management' 
vocation concerns. Fama (1980) looks at how the officials' profession concerns may 
influence their motivators and subsequently their activities. Narayanan (1985) watches 
that best supervisors who are worried about work advertise notorieties may have 
motivators to take activities that lift measures of here and now execution to the 
detriment of making long-run investor esteem.  
 Thadden (1995) likewise implies management' motivating forces to help here 
and now execution. In the divulgence writing, Nagar (1999) demonstrates that the 
administrator's worries about speculators' appraisal of his capacities can influence data 
quality. As of late, Hermalin and Weisbach (2007) demonstrate that profession 
concerns may make CEOs control the announced money related data dispersed to open 
capital markets. Utilizing a flagging model, Rotemberg and Scharfstein (2003) 
demonstrate that item showcase competition builds supervisors' penchant to control and 
distort financial report data. Karuna (2007) finds that organizations in more focused 
enterprises tend to screen their CEOs all the more intently along these lines fueling the 
profession concern issue. 
 The clashing part of item advertise competition on the nature of financial report 
data drives us to our first exact inquiry: does item advertise competition increment or 
lessening the degree of financial report distorting as prove by the recurrence of profit 
repetitions in a specific industry in a given period, in the wake of controlling for other 
organization components? While the view that item showcase competition mitigates 
administrative office issues is generally held, there is significant variation among 
financial experts on the degree to which item showcase competition is viable. In 
particular, Friedman (1953) and Stigler (1958) contend that administrative slack can't 
exist in exceptionally focused businesses. Giroud and Mueller (2007) give 
observational proof thusly. This recommends the impact of competition on monetary 
distorting is probably going to differ with the level of competition. In particular, this 
flood of the writing proposes that the recurrence of repetitions should diminish as an 
element of competition inside more focused businesses. A substitute thinking for 
expecting a non-direct connection amongst the competition and budgetary distorting 
emerges from the writing identifying with the part of loud financial report signals 
utilized as execution measures in gets that utilize RPE. DeFond and Park (1999) 
contend that the financial report based RPE measures are less boisterous in more 
focused ventures. They find that the recurrence of CEO turnover is all the more intently 
connected with RPE-based (firm-particular) financial report measures in high (low) 
competition ventures than in low (high) competition businesses. In light of the second 
contention, this paper would expect that the vocation concerns are higher in more 
aggressive enterprises because of the more predominant utilization of RPE. 
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Subsequently, we would hope to watch larger amounts of repetitions in these 
enterprises.  
 
 The hypothesis based on the above discussion are: 
H1:   The Competition positively influence the quality of the financial report 
H2:  The Agency conflict negatively influence the quality of the financial report 
H3:  The agency conflict influence the quality of the financial report more than the  
        competition 
 
RESEARCH METHOD 
 
Research Design 
 We use a quantitative method to test the hypothesis. All the data are secondary 
from the Indonesia Stock Exchange. We use the population of mining industries with 
observation period 2013 – 2017. The method to test the hypothesis using multiple 
regressions.  
 
Operational Definition 
 The fundamental factors we utilize in our investigation are industry measures of 
item advertise competition, for which we principally utilize the Herfindahl Index in 
view of the offers of all organizations with information accessible in Indonesia Stock 
Exchange. Since the Herfindahl Index is straightforwardly identified with the number 
of firms in a specific industry, we additionally utilize the Normalized Herfindahl Index. 
We characterize this variable as (n x Herfindahl – 1)/(n – 1), where n is the number of 
firms in a given industry. As an extra intermediary for item showcase competition, we 
utilize the opposite of the number of firms in the business (see Cremers, Nair, and 
Peyer, 2007).  
 Institutional possession has been recognized in the writing as an extra checking 
system that may go about as a substitute for item advertise competition or potentially 
other administration instruments (Gompers, Ishii and Metrick, 2003). Jiambalvo, 
Rajgopal, and Venkatachalam (2002) and Shang (2003) show that institutional 
possession is related with a lessened utilization of optional gatherings and, 
subsequently, an expanded level of money related detailing quality. Appropriately, we 
control for institutional possession by including the division of offers claimed by 
institutional speculators  
 As we contended before, CEO pay, particularly the division got from 
investment opportunities and value proprietorship is a critical determinant of money 
related distorting as confirm ex-post in income repetitions. Specifically, it has been 
proposed that remuneration “overabundances" are related to income control. For 
instance, Coffee (2003), Fuller and Jensen (2002), and Greenspan (2002), among 
others, show that stock-based remuneration and administrative proprietorship expanded 
supervisors' motivating forces to publicity and blow up detailed income and, thus, stock 
costs, which added to the 1990s securities exchange bubble. Reliable with these 
perspectives, Efendi et al. (2007) find that the probability of a misquoted budgetary 
articulation increments when CEOs have sizable possessions of investment 
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opportunities. Cheng and Warfield (2005), Bergstresser and Philippon (2006) give 
prove to recommend that value motivators got from investment opportunities and 
confined stock remuneration are emphatically connected with administrations' 
probability to take part in collection based profit administration exercises. Following 
this confirmation, we incorporate the value responsibility for CEO as a small amount of 
the aggregate pay as an extra factor of intrigue.  
 Prior research analyzing the determinants of income controls demonstrates that 
capital structure and size are two vital such determinants. In an ongoing report, Barton 
and Waymire (2004) give to prove that supervisors' motivating forces to supply 
fantastic budgetary articulations increment with the level of investor debtholder office 
clashes as proxied by the measure of use in the company's capital structure. They show 
the positive association between firms’ leverage and the quality of accounting 
information. This finding is consistent with the argument that debt contracting 
influence financial reporting. If the financial information provided in the firm’s 
financial statements is complementary to the monitoring information debt providers 
use, we expect more leveraged firms to provide financial information of higher quality. 
However, if debt providers use substitute information channels to acquire monitoring 
information, this will decrease the likelihood that the previous prediction holds true. 
Hence, we include leverage as an additional control variable. Leverage is defined as the 
sum of long-term debt and debt in current liabilities divided by total assets.  
Consistent with previous empirical studies, this study used the firm’s size as a 
control variable and is measured by the market value of equity.  
 The competition is measured by formula as below: 
   ∑   
  
    
 
RESULTS AND DISCUSSION 
 
Table 1 shows the average of earnings restatement and average value 
restatement in an industry year for different quantile competition. Q1 – Q5 refers to the 
first to the fifth quintile of the Herfindahl index. Percentage refers to the percentage of 
firms that restate their earnings. 
 
Table 1 
Earnings Restatement and Competition 
Quintile H-
Index 
Mean % of 
Restatements 
t-stat 
Q1 3.88 26.3 
Q2 3.54 11.18 
Q3 3.1 13.46 
Q4 4.02 16.64 
Q5 5.24 8.46 
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To better comprehend the connection between item advertise competition and 
income repetitions, we start our examination by investigating graphically the normal 
quantities of repetitions in an industry-year for various quintiles of the Herfindahl 
Index. In any case, we can not make any inferences on the connections amongst 
competition and profit repetitions on the grounds that the connection could be 
misleading. Since the number of organizations diminishes with the Herfindahl Index, 
the archived connection could be mechanical. This, indeed, is valid as prove from 
Table 1.  
 Table 1 Panel A records the normal recurrence of profit repetitions in an 
industry-year over the opposition quintiles. We see that the connection between the 
competition and the recurrence of income repetitions could be non-direct. The quantity 
of repetitions diminishes as the Herfindahl-Hirshman Index increments till the third 
quintile and afterward the connection turns around. This watched non-straight 
relationship is intriguing and we break down in detail later. In Panel B, we give confirm 
on the connection between the normal value estimations of the repetitions as a small 
number of normal aggregate resources. Despite the fact that we are not ready to pick 
any noticeable pattern in the information, it gives the idea that the Herfindahl Index and 
the estimation of repetitions are decidedly connected.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                    
Source: Research data 
 
Figure 1 
Number of Financial Report Quality in Quintiles 
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Table 2 
Descriptive Statistics 
Types  Number           Percentage  
Acquisition or Merger 6                           5%                                           
Cost or Expense 27                      22.5%  
IP R&D 0                           0  
Other 10                        8.3%  
Reclassification 
27                       
22.5% 
 
Restructuring, Assets or 
Inventory 
22                       
18.3% 
 
Revenue 
28                       
23.3% 
 
Total 
120                       
100% 
 
 
Table 2 provides descriptive statistics on earnings restatements. Panel B provides 
the distribution of restatements by the type of restatement for the period 2013 - 2017. 
The earnings restatement classifies the type of restatement into seven (7) categories. 
They are: (1) misstatement accounting for costs or expense (Cost or Expense), (2) 
misstatement revenue (Revenue), (3) errors relating to accounting treatment of 
investments, timing and amount of asset write-downs, goodwill and other intangibles, 
restructuring activity and inventory valuation, and inventory quantity issues 
(Restructuring, assets and inventory), (4) misclassified financial statement items 
(Reclassification), (5) improper accounting for acquisitions or mergers (Acquisition or 
Merger), (6) inadequate disclosure or improper accounting of revenues, expenses, debts, 
or assets involving transactions or relationships with new standard, and (7) any 
restatement not covered by the listed categories.  
Earnings Restatements and Product Market Competition 
This table reports the average percentage of earnings restatements and average 
dollar value of the earnings restatements in an industry-year for different quintiles of 
competition. Competition is proxied by the Herfindahl Index.  
Q1-Q5 are to the first to the fifth quintile of the Herfindahl Index. Percentage of 
earnings restatements refers to the percentage of firms within an industry that restate 
their earnings, calculated as the total number of restatements in the mining industry 
divided by the total number of firms in Indonesia Stock Exchange. Value of earnings 
restatements is the equally weighted averages of the value of the restatement scaled by 
the firm’s average total assets. 
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Table 3 
Panel A: Mean Percentage of Earnings Restatements across Competition 
Quintiles 
 Quintile of   
 Herfindahl Mean % of  
 Index restatements t-stat 
 Q1 1.94% 13.15 
 Q2 1.77% 5.59 
 Q3 1.55% 6.73 
 Q4 2.01% 8.32 
 Q5 2.62% 4.23 
 
Panel B: Mean Value of Financial Report Quality across  Quintiles 
Quintile of 
Herfindahl 
Index 
Mean Value of 
Restatements 
t-statistics 
Q1 26.57% 6.43 
Q2 31.65% 5.64 
Q3 28% 4.95 
Q4 45.86% 4.77 
Q5 42.86% 4.45 
 
Table 3 represents univariate statistics and correlation for the period 2013-2017. 
The financial report quality is measured by the number of restatement in mining 
industry divided by the total numbers of firms in Indonesia Stock Exchange. Herfindahl 
index is defined as (nxH-1)/(n-1). Gindex is Governance index and constructed 
following Gompers, Ishii, and Metrick (2013). Eindex is an entrenchment index 
(Bebchuk, Cohen, and Ferrel, 2004). The ATI governance index is constructed by 
Cremers and Nair (2005), Balakrishnan and Cohen (2013).  
The Normalized Herfindahl Index is defined as (n x H – 1)/(n-1). Gindex is the 
governance index as recommended by Gompers, Ishii, and Metrick (2003). Eindex is 
the entrenchment index of Bebchuk, Cohen, and Ferell (2004). The ATI governance 
index is constructed following Cremers and Nair (2005). The equally-weighted 
average per industry of the Gindex, Eindex and ATI index is computed based on firms 
with available information. Leverage is defined as long-term debt and debt in current 
liabilities divided by total assets. Institutional ownership is the average fraction of 
shares held by institutional investors divided by a number of outstanding shares. 
Management ownership is defined as the sum of restricted stock grants divided by a 
number of outstanding shares. Size is the natural logarithm of the average market 
value of equity in the industry in each year. Panel A provides the univariate statistics. 
Panel B provides the piece-wise correlation coefficients and their p-value. 
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Table 4 
Industry Level Univariate Statistics and Pairwise Correlations 
Panel A: Univariate Statistics 
Industry Level Variables N Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
% of restatements 120 0.020 0.022 0.002 0.240 
Quality 120 0.233 0.323 0.007 1.796 
Herfindahl 120 0.094 0.117 0.007 0.822 
Gindex 120 9.025 0.956 6.000 12.00 
Eindex 120 1.526 0.367 0.333 2.600 
ATI 120 2.236 0.403 1.200 4.000 
Leverage 120 0.237 0.094 0.070 0.501 
Institutional Ownership 120 0.361 0.095 0.102 0.624 
Management ownership 120 0.449 0.131 0.000 0.754 
Size 120 7.547 0.961 4.550 9.673 
      
 
Table 4 contd. 
Panel B: Correlations (p-value) 
 
 
Variables Quality Herfindahl Gindex Eindex ATI Leverage Inst.own 
CEO 
own  
 Herfindah
l 
0.283 
(0.001) 1.000 
      
       
 
Gindex 
0.098 
(0.232) 
-0.164 
(0.020) 1.000 
     
      
 
Eindex 
-0.030 
(0.232) 
-0.410 
(0.001) 
0.790 
(0.001) 1.000 
    
     
 
ATI 
-0.047 
(0.712) 
-0.255 
(0.001) 
0.564 
(0.001) 
0.580 
(0.001) 1.000 
   
    
 
Leverage 
-0.368 
(0.001) 
-0.110 
(0.118) 
0.033 
(0.645) 
0.072 
(0.312) 
0.160 
(0.023) 1.000 
  
   
 
Institutional 
Ownership -0.106 0.067 0.102 0.092 0.116 -0.159 1.000  
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 (0.198) (0.343) (0.151) (0.193) (0.100) (0.024)  
 
CEO 
Ownershi
p 
-0.029 
(0.725) 
-0.351 
<0.001 
-0.157 
(0.026) 
-0.158 
(0.026) 
-0.250 
<0.001 
-0.323 
<0.001 
-0.129 
(0.068) 1.000  
 Size 
-0.079 
(0.336) 
-0.067 
(0.346) 
-0.184 
(0.009) 
-0.178 
(0.012) 
-0.123 
(0.083) 
0.126 
(0.074) 
0.101 
(0.152) 
0.170 
(0.016
) 
 
 
 
Table 5 
Industry Level Regressions (with the value of earnings restatements as proxy 
financial report quality) 
Variables Quality Quality Quality Quality Quality Quality 
 coef 
p-
value coef 
p-
value coef 
p-
value coef 
p-
value coef 
p-
value coef 
p-
value 
Herfindah
l 
 
0.734 
0.00
1 0.078 0.002 0.816 0.006 0.633 0.033 0.795 0.001   
            
Gindex   0.079 0.008     0.078 0.007 0.064 0.051 
Eindex     0.147 0.119       
ATI       0.063 0.504     
Leverage   -1.286 0.000 -1.325 0.000 -1.381 0.000 -1.279 0.000 
-
1.492 0.000 
Institutio
nal 
Ownershi
p   
-1.078 0.006 -1.032 0.024 -0.960 0.045 -1.075 0.006 
-
1.209 0.006 
0.111 0.669 -0.039 0.883 -0.126 0.604 0.110 0.669 
-
0.120 0.647 
Managem
ent   
Size   0.008 0.660 0.009 0.669 0.004 0.849 0.007 0.695 0.012 0.611 
R-
squared 0.09  0.30  0.28  0.26  0.30  0.27  
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Variables Quality Quality Quality Quality Quality Quality 
 coef 
p-
value coef 
p-
value coef 
p-
value coef 
p-
value coef 
p-
value coef 
p-
value 
Observati
ons 120  120  120  120  120  120  
 
The table reports coefficients and p-values of fixed effects panel data regressions with 
year-dummies. All variables are equally-weighted at the industry level using firms with 
available data between 2013-2017. The dependent variable in all regressions is the 
percentage/frequency of earnings restatements, calculated as the total number of 
restatements in the mining industry. The Normalized Herfindahl Index is defined as (n 
x H – 1)/(n-1). Gindex is the governance index constructed following Gompers, Ishii, 
and Metrick (2003). E-index is the entrenchment index of Bebchuk, Cohen, and Ferell 
(2004). The ATI governance index is constructed by Cremers and Nair (2005). The 
equally-weighted average per industry of the Gindex, Eindex and ATI index is 
computed based on firms with available information. Leverage is defined as the sum of 
long-term debt and debt in current liabilities divided by total assets. Institutional 
ownership is the average fraction of shares held by institutional investors divided by 
outstanding shares. Management ownership is defined as the sum of restricted stock 
grants divided by outstanding shares. Size is the natural logarithm of the average 
market value of equity. 
  
 
Table 6 
Non-linear Effects of Product Market Competition 
 Quality Quality 
 
Low Concentration (i.e. 
Low 
Herfindahl index) 
High Concentration 
(i.e. 
High Herfindahl 
index)  
Variables     
 coef p-value coef p-value 
Herfindahl -0.726 0.760 0.731 0.003 
Gindex 0.049 0.351 0.062 0.119 
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 Quality Quality 
 
Low Concentration (i.e. 
Low 
Herfindahl index) 
High Concentration 
(i.e. 
High Herfindahl 
index)  
Variables     
Leverage -0.566 0.325 -1.669 0.004 
Institutional Ownership 0.029 0.936 -0.807 0.202 
Management 0.945 0.009 0.287 0.374 
Size -0.013 0.779 0.007 0.733 
Adj R-squared 0.30  0.29  
Observations used 120  120  
 
The table reports coefficients and p-values of fixed effects panel data 
regressions with year- dummies on sub-samples based on the level of competition. A 
firm is classified as High Concentration if the Herfindahl Index for that firm is above 
the median value of the Herfindahl Index of all firms and the firm is classified as Low 
Concentration if the Herfindahl Index for that firms is above the median value of the 
Herfindahl Index of all firms. Regressions 1 and 2 use the nominal value of 
restatements as the dependent variable for the period 2013 - 2017.  
 
CONCLUSION, LIMITATION, AND SUGGESTION 
 
Conclusion 
 The conclusion of the paper shows that the lowest competition of auditor restate 
their client 1,94% significantly and this number increasing follow the increasing level 
of competition. It means that the competition influence significantly on financial report 
quality. How about the agency conflict? It seems that the agency cost, as measured by 
leverage, only influence significantly on financial report quality in high competition 
environment while in low competition it does not significantly impact on the report 
quality. The other results show that management ownership only significant in 
influences the report quality in a low competition environment, while institutional 
ownership does not influence the quality either in low or high competition.  
 
Limitation 
 As the results show that the adjusted R-squared only around 30%, so there are 
still more 70% another important variables that might be influenced on the financial 
report quality. Even the sample only mining companies, but it does not mean that this 
result can not generalize into other industries. We choose mining industries because 
this industries still give important contributions for generating income in Indonesia, and 
more than that, this industry highly regulated.  
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Suggestion 
 The future research can use another industry such as manufacture, and financial. 
Because there are several factors that might influence the report quality, it was better if 
the next study uses factor analysis to extract more variables and the find the important 
variables to increase the financial report quality.  
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